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THE JUDICIARY IS A THEY, NOT AN IT: TWO FALLACIES OF INTERPRETIVE THEORY 
 
Adrian Vermeule
* 
  
  Consider the following arguments about constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
All of these arguments are widely discussed in the legal literature, especially in the most 
fashionable recent work on dynamic approaches to interpretation; all of them are widely 
viewed as at least credible or plausible, whether or not they are ultimately persuasive: 
  ● Judges should adopt canons of statutory interpretation that require a clear 
legislative statement—for example, the canon that statutes should be construed to avoid 
serious constitutional questions—in order to promote beneficial legislative deliberation 
about constitutional values or important policy questions.  
  ● Judges should adopt constitutional rules that enforce “due process of lawmaking”—
for example, requirements of congressional factfinding under statutes that enforce the 
14th Amendment—in order to promote a well-functioning legislative process. 
  ● Judges should adopt textualism because it has a disciplining effect, ex ante, on 
legislatures and other drafters of legal texts. 
  ● Each judge should decide what is, in her judgment, the best approach to 
constitutional and statutory interpretation, and then adopt it. 
  ● Each senator who must vote on the confirmation of a judge or justice should decide 
what is, in her judgment, the best approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation, 
and then vote to confirm if, and only if, the nominee has adopted that approach. 
  In what follows I shall take on a heavy burden. I shall attempt to show that each of 
these arguments, and others like them (in ways I shall specify below), are logically 
fallacious. The point is not that these arguments are substantively incorrect, on the merits. 
The thesis is a more ambitious one: the arguments are conceptually confused, and thus do 
not count as valid arguments at all. Each of them commits the fundamental mistake of 
overlooking the collective character of judicial institutions—of overlooking that the 
judiciary, like Congress, is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’
1 That mistake produces the critical, and 
erroneous, assumption that coordinated judicial adoption of some particular approach to 
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legal interpretation is both feasible and desirable. Once we drop that assumption, it 
becomes clear that the premises implicit in these arguments do not support their 
conclusions. In some cases the conclusions may still hold, independently; but they would 
have to be justified, if at all, on entirely different grounds. 
***** 
  The key to the analysis is a matched pair of logical fallacies that are pervasive in 
interpretive theory: the fallacies of division and composition. Although each fallacy has 
been given several, subtly different definitions,
2 for present purposes we may usefully say 
that each rests on a mistaken treatment of factual or normative generalization. The fallacy 
of division arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, a whole set is taken to 
apply to any particular member of the set. That an army is strong does not entail that any 
one of its soldiers is strong; that the world would be better if all nations disarmed does 
not entail that any particular nation should disarm unilaterally.
3 The fallacy of 
composition arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, any particular member of 
a set is taken to apply to the whole set. That each particular member of a jury has decided 
views about the defendant’s guilt or innocence does not entail that the jury as a whole has 
a decided view; its members’ views may not be unanimous. In a group of mountaineers 
scaling Everest, it is sensible for some member to forego the final ascent in order to 
secure the base camp. It would hardly be sensible for the whole group to do so.
4 
  Problems of division and composition occur when, and because, theorists of legal 
interpretation overlook that the judiciary is a collective body, not a single individual. The 
failure to appreciate that large fact about judicial institutions causes interpretive theorists 
to stumble into the mistakes about generalization that go under the rubrics of division and 
composition. Generalization problems arise when legal theorists ask, explicitly or 
implicitly, the following question: “what is the best interpretive approach for judges (or 
courts) to adopt?” That question omits an essential feature of the problem. Imagine that a 
given judge, any judge, is deciding whether to be a textualist, an originalist, a purposivist, 
or something else, and has turned to the academic literature on interpretive theory for 
guidance -- however counterfactual this picture may be. The legal theorists’ counsel 
speaks to the question which approach would be best if adopted by “the judges” (or “the 
courts”). But that is not the question that our particular judge needs to answer. Our judge 
                                                 
2 Although introductory works in logic offer definitions of the two fallacies, see, e.g., Stephen Toulmin, An 
Introduction to Reasoning (2d ed. 1984) 171-72, several different definitions are plausible, each with subtly 
different emphases or implications. See infra note ---. For a different application of the two fallacies to 
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wants to know what approach is best for her to adopt. The two questions will have very 
different answers if the other judges adopt different theories of interpretation than she 
adopts. 
  Two points are critical here. First, that a given approach would be best for the whole 
court or judiciary does not entail that it would be best for any given judge taken alone. 
The inference from the group-level claim to the individual-level claim fails if judicial 
coordination on a particular approach is infeasible or unlikely. The best approach for any 
given judge to adopt will vary depending on whether the other judges adopt the same 
approach, or instead adopt (any of several) other approaches, either because they disagree 
with the first judge’s normative conclusions, because they are incapable of full 
compliance with the relevant prescriptions, or for some other reason. Second, and 
conversely, that a particular approach is best for any given judge need not entail that it 
would be best for the whole court (or judiciary). If a diversity of approaches is desirable 
for systemic and institutional reasons, then it would be an affirmative bad for all the 
judges to coordinate on a particular approach. To overlook the first point is to commit the 
division fallacy; to overlook the second is to commit the composition fallacy. And, of 
course, the same reasoning applies from the standpoint of every judge in the system. 
  In this picture, the interpretive theorist has gone wrong by casting the critical question 
at an excessively high level of abstraction. For reasons I will explore below, the 
collective structure of judicial institutions means that it is simply inadequate to theorize 
about interpretation as if the judiciary were a unitary institution, perhaps conceived as a 
single individual.
5 In the language of moral philosophy, the interpretive theorist has 
overlooked essential questions of nonideal theory, which asks what obligations people 
have when others will not or cannot comply with their (identical) obligations.
6 In the 
language of economics and consequentialist political theory, the interpretive theorist has 
overlooked essential questions of the second-best, which arise when a general or 
collective equilibrium cannot be attained. Whatever metaphor is best, the core problem is 
that the theorist has gone wrong by omitting essential institutional detail. It is an irony of 
interpretive theory that so much emphasis has been given to exploring the consequences 
of the legislature’s collective character,
7 while inadequate attention has been paid to the 
same problem in judicial institutions.
8 
                                                 
5 This is so whether or not the single judge resembles Hercules. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(1986). Dworkin’s stylized adjudicator both possesses superhuman capacities and also sits as a single-judge 
court. An objection to the first assumption is that, in fact, no real judges possess superhuman capacities. 
See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with 
Intratextualism, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 730 (2000). Here I mean to press an objection to the second assumption: 
the collective character of judicial institutions undermines any analytic approach that presupposes a unitary 
interpreter. 
6 See Liam Murphy, Moral Demands and Non-Ideal Theory (2000); Edna Ullman-Margalit, The 
Generalization Argument: Where Does the Obligation Lie, 73 Journal of Philosophy 511 (1976).  
7 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Chapter 10 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation 
(1999); Shepsle, supra note __. 
8 The claim is not that legal theory generally has ignored the collective character of judicial 
decisionmaking. Important literatures in social choice and voting theory have explored aggregation 
problems on multi-judge courts. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 
802 (1982); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986); 
David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 
80 Geo. L.J. 743 (1992); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theory and Judicial Decisionmaking: A   TWO FALLACIES 4   
  Part I examines interpretive theories, methods and doctrines that commit the division 
fallacy. After examining circumstances in which any particular judge might do badly to 
adopt an interpretive approach that might be best if adopted by the whole judiciary, I will 
suggest that a range of interpretive doctrines are fallacious in this way. This point knocks 
out arguments that would justify textualism by its disciplining effect on legislatures; that 
justify canons of construction, or interpretive default rules, by pointing to their 
democracy-forcing or information-eliciting effects; or that justify constitutional rules by 
reference to their beneficial effects on the lawmaking process. The common conceptual 
mistake in these arguments is the undefended assumption that sustained judicial 
coordination on a particular interpretive approach or canonical regime is feasible. 
Whether it is feasible is an empirical question; I shall give tentative reasons for believing 
that it is not feasible, in our system anyway. To the extent that coordination across judges 
is not feasible, I shall also claim, it will often be affirmatively harmful or perverse for any 
particular judge to adopt the approach that would be best if all judges coordinated on it. 
  Part II provides a parallel analysis for the composition fallacy, examining reasons 
why a court or judiciary might do badly to adopt a given approach even if particular 
judges might do well to adopt that same approach. Where these reasons hold, they 
suggest that judicial coordination on a particular approach may be not only infeasible, but 
also affirmatively undesirable. New or additional judges joining a court should, at the 
margin, adopt the interpretive theory that will produce a diverse mix of approaches on the 
court as a whole. The import of this view for constitutional and statutory interpretation is 
that the best judiciary will include an appropriate mix of interpretive formalists (or 
textualists) and functionalists (or purposivists).  
  Part III canvasses some persistent themes in legal theory that tend to promote 
generalization mistakes: modeling imperatives, in which the judiciary is treated as a 
unitary actor to make formalization more tractable; the approximation assumption, or the 
fallacious belief that if an ideal is unattainable the best course is to approach that ideal as 
closely as possible; and, related to the last point, the tendency to see individual judges as 
creative artisans rather than as a special type of bureaucrat acting within a collective 
decisionmaking institution. In the conclusion, as throughout, I suggest that interpretive 
theory based on first principles must be supplemented by nonideal interpretive theory. 
Any account of constitutional and statutory interpretation should address interpretation as 
it actually occurs, in a collective judicial structure that produces intractable disagreement, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 Theoretical Inquiries L. 125 (2002); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic 
Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2297 (1999). There is also a growing literature in 
political science on intracourt strategic behavior, see, e.g., Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, & Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court (2000), and on the relationship between higher and lower 
courts in a hierarchy, see, e.g. McNollgast, Politics and The Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine 
and The Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631 (1995); Matt Reddick & Sara C. Benesh, Norm Violation by 
the Lower Courts in the Treatment of Supreme Court Precedent: A Research Framework, 21 Just. Sys. J. 
117 (2000); Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. Legal Stud. 649 (2000). For a valuable 
overview, with applications to constitutional theory, see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review 
(draft on file with author). But these literatures have not, to date, penetrated far into interpretive theory, 
particularly the rapidly growing literature on interpretive default rules and canonical interpretive regimes. 
The interpretation literature overwhelmingly tends to persist in treating the judiciary as a unitary actor. See 
infra notes (providing examples).   TWO FALLACIES 5   
doctrinal and methodological inconsistency over time, and partial compliance with shared 
norms. 
I. THE FALLACY OF DIVISION 
  Section A lays some conceptual groundwork and delineates the scope of the inquiry. 
Sections B and C turn to examples from statutory and constitutional interpretation, 
respectively. 
A.  Judicial Coordination and Interpretive Method 
The division fallacy is to suppose that an interpretive strategy that would be 
beneficial if adopted by all judges should therefore be adopted by any particular judge. 
Whether the conclusion holds depends on what other judges are doing. Judges vote on 
cases within a collective judicial bureaucracy that, at appellate levels, always sits on 
merits cases in multi-judge panels. The collective character of judicial institutions 
produces several reasons for believing that (or circumstances in which) a particular judge 
might do badly to adopt an approach that would be best if adopted by all judges. The 
essential idea is that interpretive accounts that explicitly or implicitly require a whole 
court, or the whole judiciary, to coordinate on a given course of action, and to sustain that 
course of action over time, demand too much of judicial institutions. 
There are two separate and independent points here, one analytic, the other empirical. 
Analytically, the premise that it would be best for all judges to coordinate on a given 
approach does not, without more, yield the conclusion that any particular judge ought to 
adopt that approach. Whether that is so depends upon what other judges do. Empirically, 
it is often costly or simply infeasible for the judiciary to coordinate upon a particular 
course of action, and to sustain that coordination to the degree necessary to affect the 
behavior of other institutions and actors. Much more work would have to be done to 
substantiate the empirical claim, but the opposite assumption—that judges can easily 
coordinate on approach that would be best for whole system (if it were agreed what 
approach that is)—is also unsubstantiated. Neither position has any natural or 
methodological priority; until the needed work has been done we can do no better than 
proceed on the basis of casual empiricism and informed impressions about the feasibility 
of judicial coordination. 
We need to be clear, at the outset, that the division fallacy only bites against 
interpretive accounts that explicitly or implicitly require coordinated judicial action. 
Some accounts lack this character; a few theorists seem to hold the view that the 
Constitution, rightly understood, directly prescribes rules of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation that any individual judge is obliged to follow, regardless of what other 
judges do.
9 Claims of this sort do not present division problems because they exclude any 
reference to the collective character of judicial institutions (although the price of avoiding 
division problems is that these accounts require an implausible reading of the 
Constitution, which says very little, directly or indirectly, about methods of legal 
interpretation).
10 But the marked trend in interpretive theory has been towards “dynamic” 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., John Manning, Textualism as Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1997). 
10 As I have argued at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 NYU L. Rev. 
74 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885 
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accounts that do require or assume coordinated judicial action. And the division problem 
does bite on those accounts. Embedded structural features of judicial institutions, which I 
shall now survey, block the necessary coordination. 
  1. Irreducible disagreement 
  The most important practical consequence of the collective character of the judiciary 
is to produce irreducible disagreement within the judiciary about competing interpretive 
approaches - both disagreement within panels or courts and, over time, across panels or 
courts. The history of interpretive theory in American courts is, above all, a history of 
persistent and deep disagreements among judges and courts about the proper methods and 
sources of legal interpretation. As to methods, judges who emphasize the ordinary 
meaning of constitutional and statutory text criticize those who emphasize the purposes 
of framers or legislators, who in turn criticize devotees of specific legislative intentions; 
each of these groups itself fractures into competing variants. As to sources, the history of 
American interpretation is full of cases that have become chestnuts precisely because 
text, history, interpretive canons, constitutional and statutory policies, and other sources 
pull in different directions in those cases, forcing judges to make consequential choices 
about their priorities. The competing camps of interpretive theory are not (solely) 
scholastic inventions; they reflect chronic, possibly intractable, differences in judicial 
views about the proper treatment of recurring interpretive problems. 
To be sure, the scope of judicial disagreement will be reduced, and its consequences 
ameliorated, to the extent that judges reach “incompletely theorized agreements”
11 about 
interpretation. In the most optimistic story, judges who disagree on high-level principles 
will converge upon particular rules, canons or statutory techniques.
12 Consider the 
possibility, for example, that both textualists and intentionalists might converge on a rule 
excluding legislative history, the former because they think it irrelevant in principle, the 
latter because they come to believe, empirically, that legislative history misleads judges 
about legislative intent. A less useful version of the incompletely theorized agreement, 
however, occurs when judges who agree on high-level principles find that they disagree 
about a wide range of particular interpretive canons, rules or problems. Self-described 
intentionalists might sharply disagree about, for example, the intentionalist value of 
rejected legislative proposals. The extent and scope of disagreement will also be heavily 
sensitive to the type of court at issue. The base rate, for most lower appellate courts, is a 
great deal of agreement in any type of case, so it isn’t surprising to find agreement on 
many statutory and constitutional cases as well.
13 At the Supreme Court level, however, 
                                                 
11 Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733 (1995). 
12 For an empirical study whose findings emphasize this point, albeit a study conducted on a very limited 
scale, see Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1409 (2000). Examining four (!) Seventh Circuit opinions in which Judges Easterbrook and Posner 
voted for different judgments, Farber finds that the choice between formalist and antiformalist interpretive 
methods did little to determine the two judges’ votes. Note, however, that interpretive theories might 
“matter” in many other senses than their effect on outcomes in particular cases. To take only one example, 
different interpretive approaches that converge on outcomes might nonetheless entail very different 
decision costs. If formalist judges reach a given result after reading a short chunk of statutory text while 
purposivist judges reach the same result after reading a few hundred pages of legislative history, the 
systemic costs of the two approaches will differ markedly even if outcomes do not. 
13 Farber quite properly acknowledges this about his findings. See supra note ---, at 1411.    TWO FALLACIES 7   
cases are harder, disagreements are sharper, and the effectiveness of precedent in 
dampening theoretical disagreement is reduced. 
The most we can say, in the abstract, is that the possibility of muting disagreement in 
these ways needs much more empirical assessment than it has received so far. But a 
rudimentary acquaintance with American interpretive theory and practice suggests that, 
when the empirical work is done, some quantum of irreducible and important 
disagreement will be found to pervade the judiciary, not only between or among 
coordinate courts, such as the lower federal appellate courts, but also within courts. As 
their opinions suggest, judges really do differ about interpretive methods, tools, and even 
outcomes. Any judge who thinks that it would be better for the court, or the judiciary as a 
whole, to adopt Method A rather than Method B must consider the possibility that the 
next judge over is equally convinced that Method B would be the best approach—not 
merely for that judge, but for all concerned.  
  2. Inevitable mistakes and noncompliance 
  Even where disagreement is absent, or at least not openly debated, different judges 
may do different things with similar statutory problems. Judges’ behavior may differ 
even if their (stated) principles do not. An important possibility is sheer human error 
resulting from the cognitive load under which judges labor. Judges, like others, face 
important shortages of time, information, and theoretical acumen. Decisions interpreting 
statutory and constitutional provisions will, with nontrivial frequency, announce 
rationales or reach results that contradict widely agreed-upon interpretive rules, and thus 
count as mistakes from any normative perspective. In a large number of these cases the 
judges who issued the decisions might themselves condemn the decision, if reviewing it 
without constraints of time and information. But the feedback mechanisms that might 
promote this form of learning are feeble in the extreme. Judges rarely have the leisure to 
reevaluate old decisions, unless a higher court reverses the decision and sends it back; 
even then, of course, the lower judge may attribute the reversal to principled 
disagreement or partisan biases, rather than acknowledge that his initial decision was 
mistaken. 
Less commonly, but more dramatically, we might imagine situations in which some 
judges engage in bad-faith noncompliance with agreed-upon interpretive rules. Very few 
deny that there is some domain, perhaps a large domain, of easy interpretive cases—cases 
in which the obvious meaning of a legal text captures a straightforward linguistic, legal 
and social consensus, one that corresponds to a sensible account of constitutional or 
statutory polices, and in which other sources of meaning, if checked, would confirm the 
obvious meaning. Judges motivated by strongly-held policy convictions that run counter 
to the text may write opinions that erroneously classify easy cases as hard ones, 
exaggerating minor statutory quirks into ambiguities that may be resolved with reference 
to grandiose claims about background interpretive principles.
14 In some fraction of cases 
the Supreme Court may eventually correct the lower courts’ mistake, but it is unclear 
                                                 
14 An example in the latter category, in my view, is the Supreme Court’s famous decision in Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of 
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stanford L Rev. 1833 (1998). For a 
contrary view, see Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (2000).   TWO FALLACIES 8   
how often this occurs; as we shall see below, Supreme Court review is probably 
inadequate to squeeze all disagreement and error out of the interpretive system. 
3. Aggregation problems and cycling 
Under certain circumstances, the distribution of views across a multi-judge court may 
produce Condorcetian voting cycles, in which judges who may choose from any one of 
three or more positions find that a majority coalition exists to defeat each position.
15 Even 
if the judges’ individual views are well-ordered, the collective ordering is intransitive, 
and therefore (in one sense of the term) incoherent,
16 even irrational. Voting cycles of this 
sort may be suppressed by adopting a rule that arbitrarily stops the cycle at some point 
(such as a doctrine of stare decisis), but this empowers agenda-setters because the content 
of law becomes highly sensitive to the order in which cases arise.
17 Arrow’s Theorem 
demonstrates that no decision rule can avoid this dilemma, given certain reasonable-
seeming stipulations about admissible views and permissible ways of ordering those 
views. 
The significance of cyclical voting is unclear. Under reasonable empirical 
assumptions, the arrangement of views across judges frequently displays no collective 
instability (“single-peaked preferences”) or are sufficiently homogenous that the most 
contestable stipulations of Arrow’s Theorem do not apply (Sen’s “value-restricted 
preferences”). The sole point relevant here is that the work on judicial voting cycles 
generalizes fully from substantive views to methodological positions -- to the choice of 
rules for constitutional and statutory interpretation. On a three-judge court, let us 
imagine, there are three possible views about the use of originalist evidence in 
constitutional interpretation. View 1 is that it should never be used; View 2 is that it 
should always be used; View 3 is a plain-meaning rule, under which the material is used 
only when the constitutional text is ambiguous or vague. The three judges rank these 
approaches differently. Judge A is a committed originalist: she believes that originalist 
evidence should always be used, but if that position is ruled out, she believes that it 
should at least be used in cases of textual ambiguity. (Judge A, that is, ranks the 
approaches in the order 2-3-1). Judge B is hostile to originalism, and believes that the 
material should never be used; but if it is to be used, Judge B think that it is unrealistic to 
attempt to cabin it by a plain-meaning rule. (So Judge B ranks the approaches 1-2-3). 
Judge C think the plain-meaning approach best, but if that is rejected, thinks that total 
disavowal of originalist material is better than unrestricted use. (So Judge C ranks the 
approaches 3-1-2). Under this distribution of views, the court’s method of constitutional 
interpretation will cycle endlessly or, if stare decisis applies to rules about interpretation, 
stop arbitrarily.  
 
                                                 
15 Easterbrook, supra note __. 
16 For an exposition of various relevant senses of incoherence, see Kornhauser and Sager, supra note __.  
17 This effect is usually described as “path dependence,” but that term has multiple meanings, and is often 
invoked inaccurately, so I prefer to avoid it here. For a taxonomy of the term’s various senses, see Oona A. 
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law 
System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2001).   TWO FALLACIES 9   
4. Exogenous and endogenous change 
  In some periods methodological disagreements, mistakes, and aggregation problems 
are temporarily muted or restrained by political consensus or aggressive Supreme Court 
oversight. An observer of American legal interpretation circa 1965, for example, might 
have thought that legislators, agencies and judges had coordinated on a shared set of 
interpretive tools and methods praised by legal-process theorists. Those methods 
prominently featured balancing tests in constitutional interpretation, purposive statutory 
interpretation, and easy recourse to legislative history. 
But this sort of coordination of the interpretive system is rarely stable, and rarely lasts 
for long. One possibility is that exogenous social shocks, arising from political, 
economic, and technological developments, will call into question the empirical premises 
on which the prevailing consensus rests and change the political valence of interpretive 
methods. Another possibility is endogenous oscillation between or among interpretive 
methods, which can operate either in place of or in addition to exogenously-driven 
change. Consider the possibility that judicial use of legislative history will oscillate over 
time, because increased use will cause legislators to pollute the history with obviously 
unreliable material, causing judges to downplay its importance, causing legislators to 
reduce their efforts at manipulation, and so on.
18 
Even if judges craft a temporarily stable interpretive consensus, it may have no effect 
at all on legislative behavior in the short or medium term, just because of the lag-time 
built into the interpretive system. Old statutes (statutes enacted before the courts 
announced the new interpretive rule) will take some time to proceed through the lower 
courts and receive a definitive Supreme Court construction, or a definitive adjudication of 
their constitutional validity. By the time new statutes (enacted after the newly-announced 
rule) present themselves, the Court’s composition may have changed, or new alliances 
and new doctrines may have formed. For an example of this dynamic, consider that the 
Rehnquist Court has formulated several interpretive doctrines intended to increase 
congressional respect for federalism, such as the requirement of detailed congressional 
factfinding under statutes that enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against states.
 19 Those 
doctrines have, in most cases, been applied to statutes enacted before the new doctrine 
was announced.
20 By the time new statutes dominate the pool of litigated cases, the 
Rehnquist Court, and the relevant interpretive doctrines, will probably have passed into 
history. 
Apart from the dynamic interplay between courts, legislatures and agencies, 
endogenous change may arise from interpersonal dynamics within courts. One possibility 
is that, on the Supreme Court, various Justices alter their interpretive positions over time 
in response to the positions colleagues take. Dynamics of this sort can occur if, for 
example, some Justices wish to occupy the Court median while the Court as a whole is 
                                                 
18 Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 149 (2001). 
19 See infra notes ---. 
20 College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999)(invalidating the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act’s application to states); Board of Trustees of 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating the application of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to states); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating the application 
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shifting to the right or left, if some Justices move towards extremes to occupy roles left 
vacant by the departure of other members, or if like-minded Justices polarize towards 
extreme views; I will take up the last possibility in more detail below. 
In light of these possibilities, it is unsurprising (though not predictable ex ante) that 
the legal process consensus had been shattered by the mid-1980s, after the resurgence of 
the Republican Party and the appointment of a cadre of conservative judges. All of the 
major elements of the legal-process consensus were either been discarded or were subject 
to serious critiques. Constitutional balancing tests were on the intellectual defensive;
21 
both constitutional and statutory interpretation were animated by newly formalistic 
approaches, including textualism and originalism; and legislative history had come under 
attack as legally irrelevant and excessively manipulable. For present purposes it does not 
matter whether the relevant changes were caused by exogenous political change or 
reflected endogenous oscillation or judicial dynamics of some kind. The important point 
is that interpretive method is highly unstable, at least in the medium and long term. 
5.  The structure of judicial institutions    
Taken singly or collectively, these institutional facts—irreducible disagreement, 
mistakes and noncompliance, aggregation problems, and change over time -- undercut 
any argument that implicitly requires that a given interpretive approach be adopted by all 
judges (if it is to work for any judge) and sustained for long periods. Whatever 
interpretive account of this sort a given judge adopts, other judges will adopt different 
ones, both at the same time and over time. The heterogeneity of interpretive approaches 
will block the implicit generalization on which the relevant approaches depend. 
A tempting mistake here is to think that heterogeneity and fluctuation cannot exist in 
a hierarchical court structure, one topped by a high court with power to lay down 
systemwide interpretive rules and to bind lower courts to substantive results. But the 
picture of a centralized, hierarchical judiciary is fantastic. It omits a number of 
institutional fault lines, internal to the structure of judicial institutions, that hamper 
judicial coordination on interpretive strategies: 
Divisions within lower courts. Sometimes, or on some questions, lower courts follow 
a unified course of action within a common legal and intellectual framework. Often, 
however, they do not. Putting aside the district courts, whose judges are largely free to 
pursue their preferred interpretive and substantive policies in cases that the parties will 
not appeal (perhaps because they have been strongly encouraged to settle), the circuit 
courts are hardly a monolithic, unified actor. In some cases there are strong substantive 
disagreements across circuits; in some cases circuit mechanisms for internal coordination 
are unwieldy;
22 most simply, messiness is pervasive just because there are hundreds of 
appellate judges spread across more than a dozen lower courts. Importantly, there is no a 
priori guarantee that certiorari review will bring uniformity to lower-court 
                                                 
21 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943 (1987). 
22 Consider the Ninth Circuit’s cumbersome two-level process for en banc review, in which a case is first 
reheard by a panel of eleven judges, including the Chief Judge if possible. Only after this initial rehearing, 
if the case is deemed an appropriate candidate, may the Court order a second rehearing by the full court. 
Fed. R. App. Pro. 35 (9
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decisionmaking.
23 Whether it does so is an empirical question that has received 
insufficient study,
24 and that will undoubtedly have different answers in different legal 
contexts and in different eras. 
Noncompliance by lower courts. Another possibility is that lower courts, or a critical 
subset of them, will defy the Supreme Court’s instructions, more or less covertly. 
Canonical examples are the district courts’ foot-dragging after Brown v. Board of 
Education,
25 and, from a later period, the D.C. Circuit’s sustained pattern of 
noncompliance with, even defiance of, the Supreme Court’s instructions for interpreting 
the Administrative Procedure Act.
26 The possibility of defiance, at least on some issues 
and for some period, should be unsurprising. Although lower-court judges may 
experience a reputational cost if the Court reverses their decisions or admonishes them in 
a written opinion, it is hardly clear that the Court has the institutional capacity to catch an 
appreciable fraction of noncompliant decisions; and of course the Court cannot subject 
theoretically subordinate judges to any serious, direct sanctions, such as financial 
penalties. 
A notable recent example of lower-court recalcitrance involves the Commerce 
Clause. Despite two prominent Supreme Court decisions invalidating federal statutes for 
exceeding the Clause’s boundaries, lower courts have consistently declined the Supreme 
Court’s apparent invitation to expand the new analysis to statutes such as the Endangered 
Species Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, or various federal statutes 
that criminalize possession of machine guns and drugs.
27 Remarkably, lower court judges 
have, in recent years, voted to reject almost all Commerce Clause challenges to federal 
statutes, regardless of the judges’ party or background views of federalism.
28 This 
                                                 
23 These points connect well to Peter Strauss’ famous justification for the rule of deference to the 
reasonable interpretive views of administrative agencies. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Strauss argues that Chevron is best justified as a means of ensuring 
that national statutes are given a nationally uniform interpretation. Absent Chevron, the regional circuit 
courts will predictably give statutes different de novo interpretations, and the Supreme Court’s capacity to 
resolve circuit conflicts may prove an inadequate solution. The Chevron Court thus acted to centralize 
interpretive authority in national agencies by requiring the regional courts to defer to the agencies’ 
readings. See Peter L. Strauss, 150 Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited 
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987). 
24 The empirical political-science literature suggests that a surprising amount of lower-court conflict goes 
unresolved. See S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive 
Variable, 78 Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 901 (1984): 901-11 (finding that, between 1947 and 1976, the Court 
denied certiorari in more than half the cases involving conflict with Supreme Court precedent or intercircuit 
conflict). The importance of the conflicts that go unresolved is of course a separate question. For overviews 
of the literature on that question, including the 1970s debate over proposals to create a national appellate 
tribunal, below the Supreme Court, to resolve intercircuit conflicts, see Michael F. Sturley, Observations on 
the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction in Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1251 (1989); 
Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 Mont. L. Rev. 119 (2002). 
25 See J.W. Peltason, Fifty Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (1971). 
26 Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup Ct. Rev. 
345 (1978). 
27 Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1253 (2003); Adrian Vermeule, Does 
Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1325 (2001). 
28 See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1253 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
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reluctance to press the Commerce Clause revolution is a nontrivial obstacle to the Court’s 
new federalist majority, which typically waits for some lower court to invalidate a federal 
statute on federalism grounds before confirming the invalidation.
29 Although no legal rule 
prevents the Court from invalidating a federal statute after the lower courts have 
uniformly sustained it, to do so would be a departure from the Court’s ordinary certiorari 
practices. Overall, it is reasonable to speculate that the new federalist majority would 
prefer lower courts to do some of the work of the Commerce Clause revolution 
themselves, actively implementing the Court’s decisions rather than bucking against the 
new Commerce Clause logic. 
Instability within the Supreme Court. Even if, per impossible, lower courts were 
perfect agents for the Supreme Court, the principal is itself multiple, composed of nine 
Justices. Irreducible disagreement, aggregation problems, shifting alliances and shifting 
membership over time combine to create systematic instability in interpretive doctrine, 
preventing the sustained judicial coordination that is necessary if interpretive doctrines 
are to be justified on dynamic grounds. The high court that is supposed to coordinate the 
hierarchical system is itself riven by disagreement, plagued by mistaken or disingenuous 
opinion writing, destabilized by aggregation problems, and buffeted by political change. 
Occasionally, to be sure, the jurisdiction’s high court will come into the hands of a 
persistent and stable majority, one that can for a few years pursue a sustained course of 
coordinated action. Perhaps the Warren Court was like that, for a few years anyway, and 
below we will see that the Rehnquist Court has attempted to coordinate on new 
procedural rules for congressional lawmaking in constitutionally sensitive areas, such as 
federalism. But the Rehnquist Court is also a statistical anomaly in many respects, 
especially in the length of its Justices’ service. It is far more typical in American law that 
campaigns of coordinated action by high courts break down with surprising rapidity; we 
will see a few examples in the next section. 
The claim is not, of course, that judicial coordination on interpretive doctrine is 
somehow impossible. We might imagine circumstances in which a united majority of the 
Supreme Court sticks to an interpretive doctrine or strategy, brings lower courts into line 
through aggressive oversight, and produces hoped-for reactions from other lawmaking 
institutions. My suggestion is simply that judicial coordination on interpretive doctrines 
and strategies is costly and unstable, and thus tends to be both relatively rare and 
noticeably fragile. In this practical and institutional sense, rather than some logical sense, 
judicial coordination on ambitious interpretive doctrines and strategies is generally 
infeasible. 
B. Examples from Statutory Interpretation 
Some concrete examples will serve to illustrate the consequences, or costs, of the 
division fallacy. I begin, in this section, with examples from statutory interpretation; 
Section C offers parallel examples from constitutional interpretation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
manuscript, on file with author); Sarah C. Rispin, Of Courts and Consequences: The Lower Courts, the 
New Commerce Clause, and the Endangered Species Act (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
29 This was the pattern in United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison 529 
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1.  Information-forcing default rules. 
  A common normative claim in interpretive theory is that judges should adopt 
information-forcing or democracy-forcing default rules: interpretive doctrines designed to 
encourage legislators to reveal their preferences explicitly or to focus their deliberations 
on particular questions. These rules have become a favorite of a wide range of theorists 
who, starting from various premises, hope that interpretive rules and canons of 
construction may be used to elicit useful information or behavior from legislatures. The 
conceptual mistake common to these proposals and arguments is that they all treat courts 
as a unitary actor. These proposals cannot survive the recognition that judges are 
numerous, that judicial institutions are partially decentralized, and that (in consequence 
of these facts) judicial attempts to coordinate on the relevant interpretive approaches are 
plagued by instability. 
Textualism. Textualists often argue for the primacy of statutory text over legislative 
history on democracy-forcing grounds. A central argument for textualism is that it 
improves legislative performance: judicial refusal to remake enacted text forces Congress 
to legislate more responsibly ex ante.
30 The argument can also be put in the language of 
information-eliciting default rules: adherence to text will prod legislative coalitions into 
revealing their preferences explicitly.
31 
The canon of avoidance. An important interpretive canon, or maxim, is that idea that 
statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions, where it is fairly 
possible to do so. Although the canon’s supporters propose a range of justifications, an 
important one is the idea that avoidance will elicit desirable deliberative behavior from 
legislators. Absent the canon, legislators might cross constitutional limits inadvertently, 
or by indirection. The canon thus encourages legislators to focus their deliberations on 
the statute’s limits and the extent to which the statute presses constitutional law in new 
directions; at the very least legislators will be forced to speak clearly, perhaps in statutory 
text, if they wish to raise a serious constitutional question. 
Clear statement rules. The canon of avoidance is a general precept that statutes 
should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional questions. Courts have developed a 
potpourri of similar canons that either (1) apply the general precept by construing statutes 
to avoid particular types of constitutional questions or that (2) construe statutes to 
promote “underenforced” constitutional norms—constitutional principles that courts are 
reluctant to enforce through full-fledged judicial review on the constitutional merits. 
Examples in the second category, sometimes called “clear statement rules,” include the 
ideas that statutes should be narrowly construed to avoid raising the question whether 
Congress has unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to an administrative 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e have an 
obligation to conduct our exegesis in a fashion which fosters th[e] democratic process [specified in Article 
I’s bicameralism amd presentment requirements”); Garrett, supra note ---, at --- (“[M]ethods like 
textualism and rules of clear statement are best understood as efforts to improve the quality of the 
decisionmaking in the politically accountable branches”); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the 
Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 383, 407-10 (1992) 
(arguing that judicial recourse to legislative history results in irresponsible and incoherent congressional 
lawmaking). 
31 See supra TAN --- (describing analogies between contracts scholarship on information-eliciting default 
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agency;
32 that statutes should be construed to avoid the question whether the statute 
unconstitutionally intrudes on traditional or essential state functions;
33 and that statutes 
should be presumed prospective.
34 In all of these cases, the standard justifications for 
clear statement rules prominently feature the democracy-forcing idea that 
“constitutionally sensitive questions . . . will not be permitted to arise unless the 
constitutionally designated lawmaker has deliberately and expressly chosen to raise 
them.”
35 
The rule of lenity. The rule of lenity is a venerable interpretive canon holding that 
penal statutes should, where fairly possible, be construed in favor of defendants. Here the 
democracy-forcing idea is that legislators should be encouraged to deliberate about 
criminal punishment and speak clearly when they decide to adopt it. 
A standard criticism of such information-eliciting or deliberation-forcing rules is that 
they rest upon mistaken empirical premises about legislative behavior and capacities.
36 
Perhaps Congress is in a strong sense institutionally incapable of fulfilling the procedural 
demands that these doctrines make; more weakly, perhaps the costs of congressional 
adaptation to those procedural demands are greater than any resulting benefits. The 
division problem suggests a different critique, one focused on judicial rather than 
legislative institutions: Information-forcing or deliberation-forcing arguments assume 
that judges can and will coordinate on the relevant canons, doctrines and precepts. Such 
arguments thus ignore the inevitable heterogeneity and fluctuation of interpretive doctrine 
across courts and over time. 
If all (relevant) courts consistently eschewed legislative history, or consistently 
adhered to clear statement rules, or to the rule of lenity, Congress might encode policy 
choices in text, squarely face important constitutional questions, and speak clearly when 
imposing criminal punishments. But the federal judiciary persistently disagrees about the 
merits of these doctrines and about their applicability in particular settings, both within 
courts, such as the Supreme Court, and across courts, such as the courts of appeals. These 
persistent disagreements produce shifting coalitions and mutable doctrines; there is no 
consistent, unified set of incentives to which Congress might respond, and no steady 
judicial policy of democracy-forcing or information-eliciting interpretation. 
  With respect to each of these interpretive tools—legislative history, clear statement 
rules, and the rule of lenity—both variation and fluctuation are the norm, not the 
exception. As for legislative history, the Supreme Court has alternately emphasized and 
downplayed it in an oscillating pattern. Its use rose from 1937 until about 1950, fell again 
until the late 1950s, then fluctuated uncertainly until a dramatic upward spike in the mid-
1970s. Another slow decline began in the mid-1980s, but usage rose again in the mid 
1990s before falling yet again towards the end of the decade.
37 At any given time, the 
Court’s opinions vary in their willingness to resort to legislative history, even where that 
                                                 
32 Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); AT&T 
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
33 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
34 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
35 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 331 (2000). 
36 Phillip Frickey & Steven Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: 
An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 Yale L J 1707 (2002). 
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history is available. This persistent instability means that the textualist resurgence led by 
Justice Scalia is most unlikely to produce a sustained disciplining or democracy-forcing 
effect on statutory drafting. “Because Justice Scalia's critique never has commanded a 
majority on the Supreme Court, its principles cannot be attributed to the Court as a 
whole, let alone to lower courts.”
38 
  The same broad pattern of fluctuating, inconsistent usage holds true of the clear 
statement rules and the rule of lenity. As to the former, the Rehnquist Court’s favored 
substantive canons differ markedly from the Burger Court’s, which in turn differ from the 
Warren Court’s;
39 all in all, “these norms constitute a kind of ad hoc, judicial 
policymaking that Congress, ex ante, would find difficult to predict.”
40 As to the rule of 
lenity, “judicial enforcement of lenity is notoriously sporadic and unpredictable. As often 
as not, the ‘instinctive distaste’ for extinguishing individual liberty without clear 
legislative warrant gives way to other tastes that can be satisfied only by broad readings 
of federal criminal statutes.”
41 
  The upshot is that at any given time some courts, panels or opinions use the relevant 
interpretive tools, and some do not. Even where a given canon is nominally invoked, 
different judges or courts assign it markedly different weights. The rule of lenity, for 
example, is sometimes treated as a strong presumption, sometimes as a weak tiebreaker; 
while clear statement rules vary both in their strength and in the sources that may be used 
to rebut them—text alone, text or legislative history, and so on.
42 This variety and 
fluctuation make democracy-forcing or information-eliciting arguments premised on the 
universal and sustained coordination of judicial behavior seem at best optimistic, at worst 
futile.    
Indeed, in a regime marked by intractable variation across judges, courts and 
decisions, and by fluctuation over time, the standard assumption -- that any particular 
judge ought to vote as she would if all other judges were to vote the same way -- may be 
worse than futile; it may be affirmatively counterproductive or perversely harmful.
43 If 
other courts, or other judges at different times, do not use democracy-forcing approaches 
or information-eliciting canons, then local or episodic use by particular judges may 
produce bad case-specific consequences without the beneficial systemic and dynamic 
effects said to justify the approach. Consider an isolated textualist decision that eschews 
legislative history on the theory that universal judicial textualism would have beneficial, 
democracy-forcing effects. If legislators’ expectations are shaped by the bulk of decisions 
that do not adopt such a theory, then the isolated textualist decision will affirmatively 
                                                 
38 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 
77 NYU L Rev 575 (2002). 
39 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as 
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992). 
40 Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1998). 
41 Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345. 
42 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Phillip P. Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory 
Interpretation (2000). 
43 The general point is that in many situations, uncoordinated idealistic or altruistic action by particular 
individuals can produce results that are morally or pragmatically inferior to universal inaction, even though 
the morally or pragmatically best results would be produced if everyone, collectively, acted altruistically. 
See J. Howard Sobel, “’Everyone,’ Consequences, and Generalization Arguments,” 10 Inquiry 373 (1967).   TWO FALLACIES 16   
misread legislators’ instructions. The same point holds in reverse: an isolated decision 
consulting legislative history, on the ground that universal judicial intentionalism would 
produce beneficial consequences, is at best futile and at worst perverse, if the enacting 
majority deliberately encoded its preferred policy in text while leaving legislative history 
to manipulation by dissenters. 
In these examples, the cost of the division fallacy is that sporadic or isolated use of a 
rule or canon justified on systemwide grounds produces decisions that are mistaken on 
any plausible account of statutory interpretation. Suppose that a given court, or panel, or 
judge justifies a dispositive invocation of the rule of lenity on the ground that it forces 
Congress to speak clearly to criminal punishments; suppose also that other courts, panels 
or judges aren’t using the rule, or are suing only in a weaker version, or inconsistently. 
Then an isolated instance of its use by one court will have no democracy-forcing effect; it 
merely gives the particular criminal defendant in the case at hand a windfall victory even 
though all other interpretive sources (text, legislative history, and so on), minus the rule 
of lenity, suggest that the statute covers the defendant’s conduct. That might be a good or 
bad thing, for independent reasons, but it cannot be justified as a democracy-forcing or 
information-eliciting approach. 
2.  Positive models of interpretive dynamics.  
  So far the examples have involved normative arguments for particular interpretive 
canons. A second class of examples involves positive models of the dynamics of 
legislation. Consider the ingenious models recently advanced by sophisticated 
intentionalists to rebut textualist claims about legislative history. In these models, 
intentionalist statutory interpretation produces a self-fulfilling equilibrium: courts 
consider legislative history as accurate, and rational legislators anticipating the practice 
monitor legislative history to ensure that it does indeed accurately reflect the deal struck 
by the enacting coalition.
44 Textualism might also produce a self-fulfilling equilibrium, 
albeit with the players coordinated on text rather than history. But if disagreement, 
mistakes and noncompliance, voting cycles or legal and political change cause different 
judges or courts to do different things with legislative history at different times, then no 
equilibrium model that implicitly depicts the judiciary as a unitary actor is very 
impressive; a more refined approach is necessary. The same point holds as against the 
whole class of rational models that portray constitutional and statutory interpretation as 
the product of a unitary judiciary, or simply an abstract “court.”
45  
                                                 
44 McNollgast [Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast], Positive Canons: The Role of 
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo. L.J. 705 (1992). 
45 William N. Eskridge Jr., John Ferejohn & Neeta Gandhi, Strategic Statutory Interpretation, Paper 
presented at Modeling the Constitution Conference (May 17, 2003) available at 
http://lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/pages/conferences/modeling_const_02/eskridge.pdf; William N. Eskridge Jr. & 
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 Geo. L. J. 523 (1992); Einer Elhauge, Preference-
Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2027 (2002); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting 
Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2162 (2002). Matthew C. Stephenson, 32 JLS 59 (2003), 
makes the interesting suggestion that even when the judiciary is “discussed as if it were a unitary actor,” 
this need not assume a centralized system of judicial review, id. at 65. But then it is not clear how conflict 
among lower courts is to be resolved; Stephenson’s model assumes, by brute force, that judicial rulings can 
be aggregated into a single “ruling” that represents “the total outcome of all judicial decisions that affect 
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  To be sure, ever-more-sophisticated rational choice models might be constructed to 
account for the mutability and inconsistency of judicial interpretation. Perhaps, in a more 
complicated model, legislators might assess the probability that judges will use various 
interpretive strategies, resulting in an expected-value calculus that will tell legislators to 
decide how much to invest in creating text, legislative history, or other interpretive 
sources. But this sort of model would put even more strain than usual on our credulity 
about legislators’ rationality, information and computational abilities. If exceedingly 
strong assumptions are needed to describe an equilibrium, perhaps the game is not worth 
the candle. Even if the necessary assumptions are not outlandish, recognizing the division 
problems that result from the collective character of judicial institutions require important 
modifications of the standard positive models of interpretive dynamics. 
3.  The distributive effects of interpretive method 
With respect to both the normative and positive examples given above, the most 
general point is that the choice of interpretive method has controversial substantive and 
distributive consequences. Interpretation is not a pure exercise in coordination across 
judges and courts; interpretive method also determines, or helps to determine, whose 
preferences the legal system satisfies, and to what degree. To be sure, many interpretive 
doctrines and canons do have a coordination component. The best outcome, from the 
systemic point of view, might be that all judges should adhere either to a rule of lenity or 
to a rule of severity, rather than mucking about inconsistently. But choosing canons, or 
choosing between textualism or legislative history, isn’t much like choosing whether to 
drive on the left side of the road or the right.
46 It is a mixed game of coordination and 
distribution,
47 in which judges desire to coordinate, but some judges would prefer that all 
coordinate on one particular rule, while other judges would prefer that all coordinate on a 
different rule. 
                                                 
46 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, “Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law” (Nomos 1993) 
283, use this analogy to describe canonical regimes. This analogy portrays interpretation, quite implausibly, 
as a pure coordination problem. Although Eskridge and Ferejohn elsewhere recognize that interpretive 
regimes have distributive effects, see id. at 284, they do not explain how to reconcile that point with their 
earlier analogy, nor do they consider the possibility that the distributive effects of alternative regimes may 
produce systematic conflict and interpretive instability within the judiciary. A similar ambiguity inheres in 
Fred Schauer’s claim that “plain meaning” interpretation can serve a “coordinating function” among judges 
who are “attempting to reach some methodological consensus in the face of substantive disagreements 
among them.” Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 
1990 Supreme Court Review 231. It is not clear whether this is intended to describe a pure coordination 
game, or a mixed game of coordination and distribution in which different judges receive different payoffs 
from coordinating on one result or another. 
47 Usually modeled as “The Battle of the Sexes,” in which Male wants to attend a quilting bee, Female 
wants to watch roller hockey, but each would prefer to attend the other’s event rather than spend the 
evening alone. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 31 
(1989). Given the distributive effects of interpretive choices, David Strauss suggests, persuasively, that the 
Battle provides a better lens for understanding constitutional interpretation than do pure coordination 
games. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 
1717, 1734 (2003). Although focal points can produce stable equilibria in the Battle, as well as in pure 
coordination games, see id.; James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists 94-97 (1994), it is also 
possible that no stable cooperative regime will emerge, because players “hold out for a distribution of 
benefits of a regime more favorable to their immediate interests.” James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms 
of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information,” 48 International Organization 387, 413 
(1994). I take this latter possibility to represent the chronic condition of judicial interpretation.   TWO FALLACIES 18   
Thus sophisticated intentionalists argue that a self-fulfilling equilibrium centered on 
legislative history is superior to an equilibrium centered on text, on the ground that the 
former better suits the organizational constraints under which legislatures act.
48 Likewise, 
a leading criticism of the Rehnquist Court’s frequent recourse to clear statement rules 
emphasizes that the Court’s preferred rules, rather than being neutral coordinating 
regimes that merely allow legislators to signal their choices, inevitably have controversial 
normative and distributive implications.
49 The Court’s presumptive canons favor 
federalism, property rights and other values, but the opposite presumptions would equally 
favor the opposite values, so normative argument and substantive conflict over the 
content of the interpretive regime is unavoidable. Finally, the rule of lenity will produce 
fewer convictions than would a rule that criminal statutes should be broadly construed 
(“the rule of severity”), and different judges will have (different) extrinsic reasons for 
preferring one outcome to the other. In all of these areas, the distributive consequences of 
alternative canons and interpretive tools are precisely what create the persistent 
disagreement, inevitable noncompliance, and political shifts that in turn prevent judges 
and courts from attaining the coordination benefits of uniform interpretive rules.
50 
C. Examples from Constitutional Interpretation 
  Parallel examples are to be found in the theory and practice of constitutional 
interpretation. 
1.  Due process of lawmaking 
  It is tempting to think that constitutional theorizing is intrinsically less susceptible to 
the division fallacy. Interpretive theorizing that assumes coordinated judicial action, the 
argument might run, is only relevant when the theorist hopes that judicial interpretation 
will influence the behavior of legislators in statutory drafting and of agencies in 
administrative rulemaking. Constitutional interpretation, on this view, is not forward-
looking in the same way. After all, most of the Constitution’s text is fixed, and 
amendments are rare events, so that adopting interpretive doctrines with a view to their 
deliberation-forcing effects on constitutional drafters would be pointless. 
But this is wrong. Many constitutional rules and doctrines are (said to be) justified on 
the ground that they will have valuable forward-looking effects on the behavior of current 
legislators. Under the general rubric of “due process of lawmaking,” theorists have 
proposed a variety of precepts, approaches and doctrines that structure the legislative 
process with a view to improving legislative deliberation and action. These doctrines 
universally assume that the requisite judicial action can easily be coordinated; they 
commit the division fallacy, in other words, by assuming that if it would be good for all 
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courts to adopt a particular strain of due process of lawmaking, it would be good for a 
particular court or judge to do so. 
Requirements of congressional factfinding. The Rehnquist Court’s revival of 
constitutional federalism has been criticized and defended, in part, on due process of 
lawmaking grounds. In the Commerce Clause area, United States v. Lopez suggested, in 
part, that the validity of national legislation might turn, not on the Court’s independent 
assessment of the statute’s connection to commerce, but instead on the quality and 
quantity of the record evidence that Congress had provided to demonstrate a commercial 
connection. The later decision in Morrison v. United States, however, seemed to reject 
the due-process-of-lawmaking strand in Lopez. In cases arising under Section 5 of the 
14th Amendment, the procedural strain has been quite marked. In Kimel v. Florida Board 
of Regents and Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court invalidated federal statutes 
subjecting states to suit under the ADEA and ADA, holding that, in both cases, the 
congressional findings accompanying the statute failed sufficiently to document the 
factual and legal predicates (a pattern of unconstitutional state behavior) necessary for 
congressional action. The Court usually leaves the point of these requirements unstated, 
but the only plausible account is that the Court is using constitutional invalidation as a 
sanction to encourage congressional factfinding, and perhaps even deliberation of a 
certain kind and quality. 
Standard criticisms of the Rehnquist Court’s resort to due process of lawmaking 
techniques focus on legislative capacities and prerogatives. One idea is that Congress is 
structurally incapable of supplying the sort of judicialized factfinding and deliberation the 
Court is demanding;
51 another idea is that these cases have bad expressive dimensions, 
suggesting a lack of interbranch comity and judicial respect for congressional autonomy. 
Given the fallacy of division, however, we may add another point: the Rehnquist Court’s 
due-process-of-lawmaking enterprise, requiring as it does a steady course of coordinated 
judicial action, is extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in judicial behavior over time and 
to disagreements within the decentralized judiciary. 
Those sources of instability have already begun to operate in the Commerce Clause 
cases. At the Supreme Court level, consider the contrast between Lopez’s interest in 
legislative procedure and Morrison’s exclusive focus on substance. Suppose that some 
Justice, at the time of Lopez, joined the majority solely on the basis that a requirement of 
congressional factfinding, if consistently adopted by the whole Court, would eventually 
have beneficial effects on the quality and depth of congressional deliberation. The hidden 
premise of the argument is that judicial coordination of this sort is feasible, not only in 
the case at hand but for the time necessary to alter congressional behavior. If, and to the 
extent that, the assumption fails because the requisite judicial coordination is infeasible, 
then a due-process-of-lawmaking approach resting on that assumption must fail as well. 
To be sure, the new federalist majority did hang together in Morrison, even if it 
discarded the democracy-forcing rationale for Lopez. A separate problem is that even a 
temporarily unified Court majority may be unable to force its agenda on the lower courts, 
who can hamper the Court’s plan by simple failure to render active cooperation. As we 
have seen, that is just what has occurred in the Commerce Clause cases: the lower courts 
have, overwhelmingly, declined to extend the Court’s precedents to new federal statutes, 
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even where a fair reading of Morrison would suggest that invalidation is the obvious 
outcome.
52 So even if the due process of lawmaking rationale still animated the Court’s 
Commerce Clause precedents, its effect might well have been diluted by lower-court 
recalcitrance. 
Overbreadth and legislative deliberation. A similar example is the free speech 
overbreadth doctrine. Roughly speaking—the conceptual and doctrinal disputes here are 
exceedingly refined
53—overbreadth doctrine permits a litigant whose own conduct is 
constitutionally proscribable to challenge a statute on the ground that it has a nontrivial 
range of applications that violate the free speech rights of parties not before the court. So 
a statute that sweeps too broadly, combining constitutional applications with 
unconstitutional ones, will be invalidated in whole, not just in part, if it impinges on free 
speech (although not if it impinges on most other constitutional rights). Although 
overbreadth has been supplied with a variety of justifications, one idea is that 
“[o]verbreadth doctrine . . . provid[es] an incentive to legislatures to draft laws that may 
affect First Amendment activity with as much precision as practicable.”
54 
That rationale holds only to the extent that the judiciary can coordinate, across judges 
and over time, on the relevant conception of overbreadth doctrine. But there is little 
reason to think that this sort of sustained judicial coordination is feasible. Consider 
Massachusetts v. Oakes, in which Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion said that an 
overbreadth claim becomes moot if the statute is amended, after the defendant’s 
conviction, to eliminate the portion of the statute that the defendant challenges as 
overbroad.
55 This seemingly technical position is actually critical, for it would demolish 
the ex ante, democracy-forcing justification for overbreadth. As Justice Scalia noted in a 
partial concurrence that, on this point, attracted five (!) votes, under the plurality’s rule 
the legislature might promulgate an overbroad law and then simply narrow the statute 
before the final appeal, thereby saving any convictions obtained under the initially 
overbroad statute.
56 
Justice Scalia’s incentive-based view is not the law, however, at least according to the 
judge-made rules governing the stare decisis effect of fractured decisions; three of the 
five votes supporting his view appeared in a dissenting opinion, and votes do not 
aggregate across judgments in this way.
57 Since Oakes, various lower federal courts, and 
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state courts, have reached opposing results on similar facts.
58 A later decision from the 
Supreme Court, Osborne v. Ohio,
59 further complicated the issue by holding that an 
overbreadth challenge could be mooted by a post-enactment judicial narrowing, rather 
than legislative narrowing, of the challenged statute. Given this inconsistency across 
courts, and arguable variation over time, it would be foolish for any judge to adopt 
Justice Scalia’s forward-looking account of overbreadth, in the hopes that coordinated 
judicial action will discipline legislative behavior in speech-sensitive areas. 
2.  The theory of precedent and retaliatory judicial activism 
  What theory of precedent should judges adopt in deciding constitutional cases? 
Accounts of precedent typically assume that all judges, including future judges, will 
coordinate on the same approach. The theoretical problems facing any particular judge 
who adopts any given approach will, however, change dramatically when other judges 
adopt different approaches. 
  Consider a story like the following. At Time 1, a particular account of precedent 
prevails in the legal system. This account might hold, for example, that a precedent 
decided at Time 1 may be overruled by a court sitting at Time 2 only if there is some 
special justification for overruling it. At Time 1 the jurisdiction’s highest court issues a 
precedent decision. Under the prevailing account of precedent, it is not permissible for 
the Time 2 court to overrule the earlier decision just because its members think that 
decision erroneous. When Time 2 is reached, however, the judges then sitting happen to 
hold a different account of precedent. Under this account, judges may overrule any earlier 
decision that is mistaken, in their current view. So the Time 2 court overrules the earlier 
decision and substitutes a precedent decision that is the opposite of the earlier one. 
  Now imagine a judge sitting at Time 3. This judge subscribes to the account of 
precedent that prevailed at Time 1—that is, precedents may not be overruled unless there 
is special justification for so doing; it is not enough that the earlier precedent be 
erroneous. On this view, to which precedent does the Time 3 judge owe allegiance—the 
decision issued at Time 1, or the overruling decision issued at Time 2? From the 
standpoint of the Time 3 judge, the overruling decision was erroneous; it invoked a 
mistaken theory of precedent, and under the correct theory the Time 1 decision would 
still be the law. The very theory of precedent that brands the Time 2 overruling as 
mistaken, however, also bars the Time 3 judge from voting to overrule the Time 2 
decision just because it was erroneous. The theory held by the Time 3 judge can be 
interpreted in procedural or substantive terms, and these interpretations now have sharply 
different implications.        
  This story is not fanciful; similar accounts are ubiquitous in constitutional law.   
Consider two narratives commonly encountered in originalist legal discourse: 
•  Before 1937, the Supreme Court issued restrictive decisions about the scope 
of national legislative power, the delegation of legislative power to agencies, and 
other topics. After 1937 these decisions were overruled, in some cases on the 
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simple ground that then-sitting Justices thought them mistaken. Should the current 
Court adhere to the overruling decisions, even though they were methodologically 
flawed, or reinstate the overruled decisions, even though to do so would require 
the current Court to adopt the same aggressive approach to overruling precedent 
that the post-1937 decisions adopted?  
•  The Warren and Burger Courts casually overruled a great many criminal-
procedure precedents, expanding criminal defendants’ constitutional rights in 
many settings. Moreover, the Court made some of its rulings prospective, in part 
to weaken the constraints of stare decisis (because prospectivity reduces the cost 
of overruling precedents). Should the current Court respect the Warren and 
Burger Court precedents, or should those decisions be treated in the same cavalier 
fashion as the older decisions they overruled?   
  The point here is not to assert that either of these accounts is historically accurate; it is 
merely to use them to illustrate the quandary that the Time 3 judge faces. What should 
the Time 3 judge do? There is no answer internal to the theory of precedent that the Time 
3 judge holds, because the theory is at odds with itself: its procedural instruction is to 
uphold the Time 2 decision, while its substantive counsel is that the Time 1 decision 
should be reinstated as the law that would obtain has the correct account of precedent 
been followed. The Time 3 judge must choose between these two possibilities on other 
grounds entirely. 
  Some will counsel the Time 3 judge to do as he would have others do, adhering to the 
procedural counsel of his theory. Others will counsel the Time 3 judge to engage in a 
form of retaliatory activism: the judge should vote to overrule the Time 2 decision, even 
in violation of his theory’s procedural counsel, in order to restore the law to the state that 
would obtain if the theory had been followed by all prior judges.
60 Proponents of the 
latter course will claim that failure to engage in retaliatory activism will, over time, 
produce a sort of ratchet effect: “conservative” courts—here defined as courts that afford 
great weight to stare decisis—will respect the decisions of “liberal” courts—here defined 
as courts that afford little weight to stare decisis. But liberal courts will not respect the 
decisions of conservative courts. Over time, legal change will systematically tend to 
come from liberal courts. If those courts also tend to be liberal in the political sense, the 
ratchet will also have a political valence over time.  
  These dilemmas arise because theories of precedent vary among judges and over 
time. Theories of precedent typically recommend that any particular judge adopt the 
theorist’s approach because that approach would be best if adopted by all judges. But 
many other judges will adopt different approaches; when they do, accounts of 
precedential decisionmaking that implicitly require or assume generalization will go 
badly awry. Theories of precedent vary across judges and over times for the same reason 
that different judges prefer different canons of statutory interpretation and different 
approaches to constitutional interpretation: theories of precedent inevitably have 
controversial normative and distributive implications. To praise “conservative” judging 
as “restrained” because it respects past precedent is to build in a presumption in favor of 
existing distributions of legal rights, economic and property entitlements, and social 
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conditions. To condemn conservative judging, so defined, is to build in systemic pressure 
for legal change. Over time, different judges with different preferences about the pace of 
legal change, and about the substantive valence of change in different periods, will adopt 
varying approaches to stare decisis. Any account of stare decisis that implicitly requires 
that account to generalize across courts and over time is, on this view, so unlikely as to be 
no account at all.  
***** 
  We may sum up the division problem as follows. In the examples above, the division 
fallacy seduces theorists of statutory interpretation into errors of inadmissible 
generalization. The implicit premise of such theorizing -- any approach that would be 
desirable if adopted by all judges should therefore be adopted by any particular judge—
treats judicial institutions as unitary rather than riven by chronic disagreement, 
noncompliance with agreed-upon rules, and political conflict. Disagreement and conflict 
might be called the circumstances of judicial politics;
61 they arise from changing 
economic and social conditions and from the distributive effects of competing approaches 
to interpretation. It is a conceptual mistake for interpretive theorists to proceed as though 
the judiciary is a unitary, rather than collective, actor. And the conceptual mistake has 
doctrinal consequences. Recognizing the division fallacy undermines a range of 
positions, doctrines and arguments, including the dynamic justification for textualism, the 
idea that canonical regimes can serve as democracy-forcing or information-eliciting 
default rules, and the Rehnquist Court’s flirtation with due process of lawmaking. 
  If all this is right, what’s a judge to do? The answer is simply that interpretive rules, 
precepts and doctrines cannot be justified on dynamic grounds. Dynamic justifications 
assume ideal conditions for judicial coordination, conditions that cannot be attained by 
the decidedly non-ideal structure of judicial institutions. To reiterate, that negative 
conclusion leaves other types of arguments untouched; other grounds may be available 
for the conclusions whose dynamic justifications have been erased. Thus textualists who 
must abandon the ex ante, democracy-forcing justification for textualism may fall back 
upon other, non-dynamic justifications for the primacy of constitutional or statutory text; 
and intentionalists who must abandon the picture of legislative history as a self-fulfilling 
interpretive regime may turn to other arguments for legislative history. Eliminating 
dynamic arguments nonetheless represents progress, for it rescues arguments about 
interpretive theory from an intellectual dead end into which they have recently strayed. 
II. THE FALLACY OF COMPOSITION 
The conceptual error that underlies the composition fallacy is a mistake about 
generalization, a mistake that is a mirror-image of the division fallacy. In the division 
case, the theorist errs by assuming that if some interpretive approach is desirable when 
adopted by the whole court or judiciary, it must also be desirable when adopted by an 
individual judge. In the composition case, the theorist errs by assuming that if some 
interpretive approach is desirable when adopted by an individual judge, it must also be 
desirable when adopted by the whole court or judiciary. We have seen that the former 
                                                 
61 With a debt to Waldron’s idea of the “circumstances of politics,” itself indebted to Rawls’ 
“circumstances of justice,” which in turn is adapted from Hume. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement 102 (Oxford University Press 1999); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 109 (Rev. ed., 
Belknap Press 1999)(1971).    TWO FALLACIES 24   
inference fails. The latter also fails if and to the extent that methodological diversity is a 
desirable property of courts or of the whole judiciary. In economic terms, individual 
judges adopt approaches at the margin, but not every judge can be at the margin. An 
interpretive approach might be best when adopted by the additional or marginal judge, 
but not best when adopted by all judges. 
A.  Is Judicial Coordination Desirable? 
Why might interpretive approaches be desirable at the margin but not globally? The 
basic reason, which we may express in several different ways, is the possibility that a 
diversity of interpretive approaches has good consequences for judicial institutions and 
for the lawmaking system as a whole. To fall into the division fallacy is to overlook that 
sustained judicial coordination on a uniform interpretive approach may be infeasible; to 
fall into the composition fallacy is to overlook that judicial coordination on a particular 
approach may be affirmatively harmful. 
Here I mean to put aside (at least) three other kinds of diversity that a judiciary or 
court might display, in addition to diversity of interpretive method: racial and gender 
diversity, political diversity, and class diversity. As a positive matter, all these types of 
diversity may overlap, to some uncertain degree, if the relevant traits are correlated. It 
would not be shocking to discover, for example, that minority judges, or female judges, 
tend to be disproportionately appointed by Democratic presidents and also tend to be 
disproportionately inclined to wield nonformalist interpretive methods. But it is unclear 
to what extent these correlations exist in fact. It would also be quite plausible to discover, 
for example, that interpretive approaches are largely uncorrelated with either of the other 
two modes of diversity. 
Normatively, we may ask whether any of these types of diversity is good in itself or 
has good consequences for the institutions of interpretation. Although it is possible to 
imagine a claim that judicial diversity of race, gender, politics or class is valuable in 
itself, or in expressive terms, it is hard to imagine a parallel claim for methodological 
diversity; interpretive approaches have no intrinsic significance or normative appeal, 
apart from their consequences for the legal system. I will thus restrict myself to the 
question whether methodological diversity has good consequences. My treatment here is 
largely derivative of important recent work on judicial diversity.
62 The contribution of 
this Part, if any, is to situate the topic of judicial diversity in the larger intellectual 
framework of generalization mistakes. 
Whatever the state of the judiciary’s racial and gender composition, or its political 
mix, methodological diversity might have distinct, and distinctly valuable, consequences. 
Although having a court composed of, for example, all textualists might be better (or 
worse) than having a court composed of all purposivists, it might be best of all to have a 
mixture of approaches.
63 The following reasons, among others, might support such a 
view: 
                                                 
62 See Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent, University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 34, Chapter 7, December 2002; Cass R. Sunstein & David A. Strauss, The Senate, The 
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992). 
63 I will confine the discussion to the benefits of methodological diversity within the highest court in the 
judicial hierarchy. It has been shown, however, that ideological diversity at lower levels of the hierarchy 
can conserve on the costs of judicial administration, by allowing high-court judges to use the known   TWO FALLACIES 25   
1. Preventing  polarization
 64  
Likeminded judges share empirical assumptions and normative commitments that 
may be exaggerated by the presence of other likeminded judges. One possibility is group 
polarization: the possibility that, as to issues that range along a single dimension (say, 
whether to give more or less weight to the rule of lenity), deliberating groups of 
likeminded judges will polarize in the direction of the predeliberation mean, and will thus 
go to extremes. Where the predeliberation mean is bimodal, so that opposing views are 
each well-represented, this effect is suppressed. So methodological diversity may prevent 
courts or panels from skewing their decisions in implausible or unexpected ways. 
2.  Moderation of competing approaches  
The previous point suggests that diversity of interpretive approaches, methods and 
perspectives will tend to moderate judicial approaches and outcomes. Suppose, for 
example, that interpretive formalism is not an on-off switch, but a continuum. We might 
well imagine that a group of textualist judges might always interpret statutes and 
constitutional provisions in a highly literalistic fashion, a group of purposivist judges 
might always interpret statutes and constitutional provisions in an extremely plastic, 
policy-sensitive fashion, and a group with diverse approaches would often follow the 
apparent meaning of legal texts but might occasionally tailor text to reasonable 
conceptions of original intentions or purposes. 
Is this moderation good? Theorists strongly committed to one approach or the other 
might say that moderation is neither here nor there. If a moderate court gets the right 
outcome (as judged by the theorists’ preferred approach), then moderation is good; 
otherwise it is not. Polarizing in the right direction is good; in the wrong direction, bad. 
But this point, unimpeachable from within any particular interpretive theory, is not 
helpful from the standpoint of the optimal design of judicial institutions. From the 
systemic perspective, the problem is how judicial institutions should be arranged given 
that many different camps of interpretive theorists each claims that its preferred approach 
is uniquely correct, and given that this disagreement over the correct interpretive theory 
seems intractable, at least for the foreseeable future. Under these circumstances, 
moderation has much to recommend it. The system designer who is uncertain which of 
the possible approaches is best might be wise to hedge the risks of wholesale adoption of 
one approach and wholesale rejection of its competitors. A methodologically diverse 
judiciary is, plausibly, the best way to minimize the risk that any particular approach will 
have bad consequences for the interpretive system.   
A more pragmatic objection is that moderation might trade off against the variance of 
outcomes. A bench composed solely of strict textualists, or of unsophisticated 
purposivists, might produce more predictable (even if more extreme) decisions than a 
bench featuring a mixture of interpretive approaches, just as a panel of extreme left-wing 
(or right-wing) judges might produce more predictable decisions than a mixed panel. 
Perhaps this is so, but perhaps it is not. For one thing, a bench of (say) all textualists 
might produce a set of decisions with equal variance, but now centered around a 
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different, more extreme mean. For another, there are critical questions here about the 
relative determinacy of the various approaches. Is purposivism inherently unpredictable, 
just because constitutional and statutory purposes can be described at any level of 
generality? Is textualism extremely manipulable? And so forth. This is another area in 
which the necessary empirical work is lacking, so that the only feasible procedure is to 
make an informed guess that methodological diversity is, on net, valuable for the 
interpretive system. 
3.  Legitimation for multiple audiences  
The audience for judicial decisions extends far beyond the litigants, or even other 
lawmaking institutions; it encompasses informed elites in the legal profession, the legal 
academy and universities generally, and the public. Different sectors of this audience 
have different convictions, often firmly held, about the proper approach to constitutional 
and statutory interpretation. The rulings of a methodologically diverse court might appeal 
to a broader segment of this audience than the rulings of a methodologically homogenous 
one. An originalist court might please originalist while dismaying nonoriginalists, while a 
diverse court might produce rulings that create a greater overall level of satisfaction, and 
enjoy wider acceptance. 
As with the parallel arguments about the feasibility of judicial coordination, the 
foregoing ideas provide empirical possibilities, institutional variables, to be taken into 
account as theorists consider the optimal design of the institutions of interpretation. The 
point is not to argue, on the merits, that interpretive diversity is desirable. It is instead to 
say that the possibility cannot be assumed away. The relevant questions must be asked 
and answered before the generalization from individual approaches to court-wide 
approaches can be made. 
B. Examples 
Two examples, one constitutional and one statutory, will suffice to illustrate the 
potential benefits of a methodologically diverse judiciary. 
  1. Formalism and functionalism in separation of powers law 
The constitutional law bearing on separation of powers is famously riven by opposing 
methodological camps: so-called formalists and functionalists. There are many different 
ways of construing these opposing ideas and of understanding what, if anything, 
formalists and functionalists disagree about; a rough description suffices for our purposes 
here. Formalists argue for attention to text and original understanding, for rule-bound 
adjudication, and for clear lines of demarcation between the branches of the federal 
government (except insofar as the branches have explicit authority to participate in each 
other's activities; the President's veto power is an example). For formalists, the critical 
threshold question is whether the challenged authority counts as an exercise of federal 
"legislative," "executive," or "judicial" power. Once that categorization is made, the 
Constitution attaches authorities and obligations to the relevant power, and the challenged 
action is then scrutinized for conformity to the constitutional allocation. Functionalists 
argue for flexible adaptation of the separation of powers to the exigencies of modern 
government, for standard-based or balancing approaches to separation-of-powers 
adjudication, and for participation by each branch in the decision-making processes of 
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commingling of their functions. It prohibits one branch from appropriating or intruding 
upon the "core functions"
65 of other branches. 
Would a Supreme Court composed of both of separation-of-powers formalists and 
functionalists do better, or worse, than a bench composed solely of committed adherents 
of one or the other approach? Plausibly the answer is better. That answer will seem 
incoherent to partisans of either view. After all, each side will say (agreeing on this 
although nothing else), whether the Court can be said to do well in any particular case 
depends on whether it has adopted the correct approach to separation of powers law; and 
the correct approach just is the approach that we favor (formalism or functionalism; here 
irreducible disagreement resurfaces). 
It is reasonable to suppose, however, that formalism and functionalism lie on a 
continuum, so that a Court, or its median member, may at any given time adopt a more-
or-less formalist or functionalist approach. It is also reasonable to think that, on this 
continuum, it is best to avoid extremes. A Court staffed solely by Justice Rehnquists and 
Whites would systematically undervalue the virtues of a rule-like approach to separation 
of powers adjudication: stability, predictability, and fidelity to text and original 
constitutional design. A bench of this sort might approve ill-considered improvisations, 
hasty institutional arrangements that tamper with the Constitution’s deep structure. In 
hindsight Morrison v. Olson
66 looks just like a case of this sort; the independent counsel 
law was, on this view, a harmful solution to a nonexistent problem. Perhaps a Court with 
more separation-of-powers formalists would not have rejected, by a 7-1 vote, Justice 
Scalia’s prescient dissent. On the other hand, the extremes of formalism also look 
unattractive; a bench composed solely of separation-of-powers formalists might choke off 
valuable structural reform, producing excessive rigidity in the lawmaking system. 
Consider the line-item veto decision, Clinton v. New York,
67 which uses strained formalist 
arguments to invalidate a bipartisan innovation that has been widely adopted in the states, 
and that is precious hard to distinguish from ordinary delegations of impoundment 
authority to the President. Indeed Clinton v. New York is formalist in another, pejorative 
sense as well: the opinion conceals the majority’s real concern, a nondelegation idea 
about transfers of excessively open-ended authority to the President, behind a dogmatic 
reading of the relevant constitutional texts. 
These examples suggest that a well-functioning approach to the separation of powers 
would minimize the sum of two types of errors: harmful decisions by political actors to 
tamper with constitutional structure for short-term advantage or poorly-deliberated ends, 
on the one hand, and judicial rejection of valuable institutional innovations, on the other. 
Formalist judges are especially alert to the first type of mistake, functionalist judges to 
the second. Plausibly, a bench composed of both formalists and functionalists might 
detect enough of both errors to minimize their sum, relative to a uniform bench of either 
stripe. From the systemic standpoint, although not from the standpoint of methodological 
partisans, a court composed of judges with diverse views about separation-of-powers law 
would produce better structural constitutional law than a court with uniform views in 
either direction. 
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2. Interpreting statutes to avoid absurd results 
  Parallel arguments apply to the question, widely debated in the theory of statutory 
interpretation, whether and when judges ought to interpret statutes to avoid absurd 
results. Interpretive functionalists, intentionalists and purposivists are particularly alert to 
cases in which statutory text is overinclusive or (more rarely) underinclusive with respect 
to plausible conceptions of legislators’ intentions or purposes. These interpreters propose 
that courts should have wide discretion to mold statutes to fit their underlying objectives 
and to avoid the bizarre or unjust consequences of literalism. Statutory formalists or 
textualists, on the other hand, are alert to detect cases in which the judicial interpretation 
to avoid absurd results creates rather than avoids mistakes. On the formalist view, 
purposivist judges are sometimes ill-informed about the precise contours of the 
compromise struck in the legislative process, mistakenly discern absurdities that an 
expert understanding of the relevant policies would show to be perfectly sensible, import 
contestable or unattractive value premises into the determination of statutory purpose, or 
underestimate the systemic values of certainty and clarity of legal obligations that 
(formalists claim) flow from resolute adherence to statutory text. 
Here too, a reasonable view is that statutory formalism is not a quality that is either 
present or absent, but a continuum; judges may be more or less formalist or functionalist. 
It is also reasonable to think that neither extreme on the continuum is attractive or even 
tenable for the judicial system as a whole. Both camps can, and incessantly do, point to 
preferred examples that illustrate the flaws in the competing approach. Formalists 
stumble over examples such as the Arkansas statute that inadvertently repealed the 
State’s entire code of laws;
68 what is the alternative to invoking absurdity in a case like 
that? Functionalists stumble over examples like the Holy Trinity case, in which the 
Supreme Court invoked the absurd-results canon to exempt an English minister from a 
statute that prohibited contracting with an alien to perform labor or service of any kind in 
the United States. The Court said that the statute should not be read to apply to “brain 
toilers” or, because this is a “Christian” nation, to ministers. The decision not only had 
elitist and sectarian undertones; it was also (I have argued) mistaken about the statute’s 
purposes, in part because it misunderstood the legislative deliberation that produced the 
relevant statutory text.
69 The general point is that a bench composed of both formalists 
and functionalists might do the best job of detecting and preventing both sorts of 
mistakes, thus minimizing their sum; a bench staffed solely by one camp or the other 
might do worse overall. 
It might be objected that the real point of all this has nothing to do with diversity. On 
this view, the point of the examples would be, not that courts should be composed of 
methodologically diverse judges, but just that courts should adopt a moderate stance that 
avoids mistakes at either extreme. A court composed of a single judge—the limiting case 
of nondiversity—might, on this view, get all the cases right if the judge is sufficiently 
skilled at avoiding the mistakes that arise from either excessive formalism or 
functionalism. In principle, as a matter of ideal theory, this objection is correct. But the 
problem is that no actual judges, in the non-ideal world of the judicial system, are capable 
of infallibly striking the optimum. Methodological diversity across a number of judges 
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harnesses the partial and fallible commitments, expertise and prejudices of different types 
of judges, alert to different types of mistakes to which interpretation is prone, and enlists 
them to produce the best overall results for the system as a whole. 
***** 
If methodological diversity is desirable, what follows? For the individual judge, 
plausibly the answer is nothing at all. We would not want to say that a judge whose prior 
beliefs or commitments are (for example) textualist should try to adopt an intentionalist 
approach in order to diversify a largely textualist court, or vice-versa for an intentionalist 
on a largely textualist court. That counsel would be psychologically unrealistic. People do 
not put on or take off interpretive approaches like a suit of clothes; such approaches are 
deeply-held jurisprudential commitments. But to ask what follows for the individual 
judge is, on the analysis here, not the right question. The benefits of methodological 
diversity are systemic rather than individualized, so they should be promoted at the 
systemic level. To the extent that methodological diversity is desirable, presidents have a 
systemic obligation to appoint nominees—true believers in whichever approach is 
currently under-represented—who will diversify the courts to which they are appointed. 
And senators have a systemic obligation to cast confirmation votes with the benefits of 
methodological diversity in mind, rather than simply attempting to stock courts with a 
uniform cast of likeminded interpreters. 
III. LEGAL THEORY AND THE UNITARY JUDICIARY 
   I have suggested that legal theory stumbles into generalization mistakes when, and 
because, it assumes that the judiciary may be understood as a unitary actor rather than a 
collective bureaucracy. But why does that mistake occur? Here I shall canvass, in an 
admittedly speculative way, some conceptual errors and academic tendencies that 
promote and perpetuate the assumption of a unitary judiciary. 
A. Modeling  Imperatives 
In its most benign version, the assumption of a unitary judiciary is not a factual or 
normative claim about actual judicial institutions. It is rather an explicitly methodological 
premise, one used by theorists developing positive rational-actor models of the 
interpretive process—the dynamic interaction between Congress, agencies and courts—in 
order to make the necessary models mathematically tractable. After all, a fully realistic 
model of the institutional interactions that shape constitutional and statutory 
interpretation would be as complicated as the lawmaking system itself. It would thus be 
unhelpful for academic purposes; simplified models isolate the comparative statics of the 
interpretive system. I said above that positive models that treat the judiciary as a unitary 
actor might not, in fact, tell us very much that is useful about those comparative statics; 
more complex models would incorporate the collective character of judicial institutions, 
and would model legislators’ responses to the risk of, or uncertainty about, shifting 
interpretive methods that arise from disagreement and aggregation problems in collective 
courts. But that point is just an internal criticism of the current work in positive political 
theory. It is consistent with the view that positive theorists can, and surely will, construct 
models of ever-greater utility and refinement. 
In this limited methodological sense the assumption of a unitary judiciary is 
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the territory: the use of simplified formal models, premised on a unitary judiciary, to 
support normative recommendations to actual institutional actors who occupy the real 
world of a collective judicial bureaucracy, not the stylized world of positive political 
theory. Models that describe interaction between a legislature—often taken to be a 
collective and internally complex body—and a unitary “court” or single judge cannot 
support any normative recommendation whatsoever to judges on actual multimember 
courts situated in multicourt judicial hierarchies. Any attempt to leverage a positive 
model that depicts the interaction between a legislature (or legislators) and a unitary, 
internally boneless “court” into a normative recommendation to an actual court, or worse 
yet the individual judges of that court, is just a semantic equivocation—a play on two 
crucially different senses of the word.   
B.  The Approximation Assumption 
I also said above that some accounts of interpretation do not require coordinated 
judicial action; they are thus untouched by generalization problems. Suppose, however, 
that an account of interpretation does require coordinated judicial action. Suppose also 
that a judge who subscribes to that account, or a theorist urging judges to subscribe to 
that account, argues along these lines: “To be sure, it is clear that not all judges will act 
on the account I favor, because of disagreement, mistakes, aggregation problems, and so 
forth. So the ideal of systemwide coordination I hold is unattainable. But it is nonetheless 
a worthy ideal, and we usually think it praiseworthy, perhaps even morally obligatory, to 
pursue our ideals as far as possible, even if we will never fully attain them. Perhaps the 
radiant power of the example I set, in strictly adhering to the approach that would be best 
for all to adopt, will eventually persuade all others to adopt it.” Is the argument sound? 
Not at all. It rests on the approximation assumption: the fallacious view that the best 
course of action is the one that approximates an unobtainable ideal as closely as 
possible.
70 To the contrary, if an ideal state of affairs cannot be fully realized, partial 
implementation of the ideal is often worse, as judged by the very criteria that support the 
ideal in the first place, than abandoning it entirely.
71 We have already seen examples of 
this in various interpretive settings. Consider the possibility that, even if a textualist 
approach would be best for the interpretive system as a whole (if all judges were 
textualists), a pattern of frequent recourse to legislative history combined with isolated or 
sporadic textualist decisions might be worse, even or especially to committed textualists, 
than universal intentionalism or purposivism.  
The empirical or psychological connection between the approximation assumption 
and the assumption of a unitary judiciary is that the former belief tends to generate and 
sustain the latter one. The implicit reasoning might run as follows: (1) Any particular 
judge should strictly adhere to the approach that would be best if adopted by all, even if 
other judges will not adopt the same approach (the approximation assumption). Therefore 
(2) the interaction among judges’ differing views is normatively irrelevant, and (3) 
interpretive theorizing may proceed as though there is only a single judge, even if we all 
know that the judiciary is a collective body (the unitariness assumption). There is, of 
course, no logical compulsion to follow this chain of reasoning; I am making a 
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psychological claim about the typical, implicit thought process of judges and academics 
interested in interpretive theory. 
C.  The Judge as Artist
72 
There is a romantic strand of legal theory that celebrates the artistry of the sole judge. 
This theoretical style portrays common-law judging, especially, as a creative activity, at 
worst as an ineffable craft, in which the judge “molds” or “shapes” precedents to meet 
social needs; Cardozo’s opinion in Buick v. McPherson is perhaps the exemplar. 
Constitutional and statutory interpretation, on these premises, is merely an extension of 
common-law adjudication. The relevant texts don’t matter much, at least once they are 
sufficiently encrusted with precedents that a later judge may in good conscience proceed 
through common-law elaboration. 
In this romantic picture of judging, little attention is paid to the collective structures 
of adjudication. Artists do not create by committee. The shifting views, intellectual 
compromises, and humdrum arrangements that are the very stuff of collective 
adjudication—incoherent opinions written to attract a majority vote; the implicit 
logrolling of judicial coalitions; the cert pool—have no place in the artistic conception, 
which is of the law, as crystallized in academically impressive opinions, working itself 
pure. Here there is no room for bothersome others, dimwitted colleagues whose 
disagreement, or noncompliance, or mutating preferences, slow or halt the march towards 
the unitary constitutional truth as delivered by the unitary judge. It is embarrassing 
enough to think that the creative activity of molding law to social ends might be shot 
through with the explicit compromises and tacit accommodations needed to produce 
collective agreement on decisions. To think that the structural conditions of collective 
judging might make it infeasible for courts to shape law into deeply coherent patterns is 
to abandon the picture of judicial artistry altogether. 
 C ONCLUSION: IDEAL AND NONIDEAL INTERPRETIVE THEORY 
  We might roughly distinguish two styles of interpretive theory, ideal and nonideal. 
Ideal interpretive theory is concerned with the ultimate normative aims of legal 
interpretation: the ideal interpreter should attempt to read constitutional and statutory 
provisions in ways that make the best sense of law’s implicit principles, or that accord 
with the best current theories in linguistics and semantics, that comport with the deep 
structural logic of the Constitution’s separation of powers, or that promote social justice, 
suitably understood. Nonideal interpretive theory is a different enterprise. It asks how 
nonideal interpreters of law should proceed, in light of widespread disagreement about 
competing ideal theories, and given the institutional constraints and political conditions 
that actually obtain in particular legal systems (especially our own).  
  Recognizing the collective structure of constitutional and statutory interpretation by 
judges, and the resulting inevitability of disagreement, incoherence, and instability in the 
theory and practice of judicial interpretation, push strongly in the direction of nonideal 
interpretive theory. The point is not, on this view, that ideal interpretive theory is 
worthless or conceptually mistaken. But ideal interpretive theory can never, even in 
principle, support normative recommendations addressed to actual interpreters in an 
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actual legal system (judges or others). Ideal theory must always be translated through 
supplemental nonideal premises about institutional capacities and performance, the 
effects of disagreement across interpreters, and the changing political forces that buffet 
the lawmaking system. 
  The point that nonideal questions are inescapable is, I have suggested, especially 
damaging to a particular class of arguments in ideal interpretive theory. Arguments of 
this sort assume both that each particular judge should do what would be best if done by 
all judges, and also that all judges should do what it would be best for any particular 
judge to do. Such arguments assume, in other words, that judicial coordination on a 
particular interpretive approach is both feasible and desirable. The first assumption 
commits the fallacy of division, the second commits the fallacy of composition. 
  These are conceptual mistakes, but they have important doctrinal consequences. The 
two fallacies of interpretive theory are pervasive, I suggest, in dynamic arguments that 
would justify textualism by its disciplining effect on legislatures; that praise canons of 
construction, or interpretive default rules, by pointing to their democracy-forcing or 
information-eliciting effects; and that justify constitutional rules by reference to their 
beneficial effects on the lawmaking process. Dynamic arguments of this sort are not 
merely wrong, in a substantive sense; they are conceptually invalid. That claim is a 
strictly negative or critical one, to be sure. But we must clear the ground for nonideal 
interpretive theory; for nonideal theory is the only kind of interpretive theory that 
nonideal judges can use. 
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